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Abstract
There have been many episodes in history where low-denomination money holdings
have been exchanged with a premium over its face value. The most recent occurred in
Panama only twenty ﬁve years ago, under a modern banking system. In such episodes,
even where there is an entity capable to provide convertibility of money holdings at
a ﬁxed rate, and when agents expect this rate to prevail in the long run, arbitrage
possibilities in the denomination of money arise as a consequence of a shortage of
liquid assets and the presence of low prices in the economy. Despite of its relevance and
recurrence, this phenomenon cannot be explained by current models of ﬁat money. To
explain it we need a model where: (i) ﬁat money comes in diﬀerent denominations which
are used as a medium of exchange, (ii) there is an entity that provides convertibility
of denominations at ﬁxed rate, (iii) the natural rate is a feasible equilibrium of the
model, and (iv) there are parameterizations where low denomination money holdings
are given an extrinsic value. In this paper we build a money search model with all this
characteristics and determine theoretically the speciﬁc conditions under which such
equilibrium naturally arises.
Keywords: Convertibility, Extrinsic value, Money holdings, Poisson technology.
JEL: E50 E52
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1 Introduction
Throughout history, the imbalances in the supply of low-denomination coins (bills) have
entailed serious problems to trade in diﬀerent regions, and for that reason they have been
exchanged with a premium over its face value, or in other words, at a diﬀerent rate from
their natural rate. To illustrate this situation, observe that in United States bills of
$100 and $10 circulates, and are accepted as medium of exchange. At the same time,
buyers and sellers know the Federal Reserve will freely exchange a bill of $100 for 10 bills
of $10, and they expect this exchange rate to prevail in any trade. Any departure from
such natural rate in favor of the low-denomination bills would grant them an extrinsic
value. Such monetary phenomenon has been recurrent along time, and its most recent
episode occurred only twenty ﬁve years ago in the Panama of 1987-1989, under a modern
banking system1. There, as a result of a major political and economic crises, $300 million
were withdrawn from the banking system, which obligated banks to borrow abroad and
reduce their liquid assets to compensate for the loss of local resources. Along with this
palliative measure, banks were closed and reopened later under several restrictions. In
particular, individuals could withdraw up to 50% of current accounts and up to 5% from
saving accounts, while certiﬁcates of deposits remain frozen. Banks were authorized to issue
notes known as Investment Certiﬁcates (CEDIS) used by citizens as a method of payment
1Another episode that exhibited the same phenomenon was the one occurred in United States at the
beginning of XIXth century. There, with the purpose of controlling inﬂation, the Treasury only permitted
issuing bank notes for an amount greater than $5. The argument was due to Adam Smith under the logic
that if banks only issue notes of high denominations, individuals would have an incentive to redeem them
more frequently, and then, banks would stay away from over printing money. However, and despite the
goodness of such macroeconomic policy, people still needing small coins (or bank notes) to make daily
transactions. In fact, to have an idea of the scale of the problem, at that time a newspaper had a price of a
penny, a laborer typically earned $5 per week, and a family paid about six cents for a pound of bacon, while
stores faced big problems to give the change to their customers (Champ, 2007). These diﬃculties caused the
emergence of private coinage of low denominations among population, since stores paid a premium when
they traded with small-coin customers. In addition, small stores did not use to have large inventories to
satisfy the demand of high-coin buyers (i.e. they had capacity constraints), and therefore buyers incurred
in losses when traded. Another example is found in Rolnick et al. (1996) who document episodes in which
low coins (made up of an inferior metallic or having less metallic content) were traded with premium over
its content in specie, in recognition of its ﬂexibility to trade with sellers. Speciﬁcally, they cite the situation
occurred in the Spain of centuries XVI and XVII, in which copper vellons were more valued than their
counterparts of gold and silver coins.
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but were trade with a discount of 15 to 25 percent. At the same time, prices and wages
declined as much as 20% in many sectors (Moreno-Villalaz, 1999). In this environment
characterized by the scarcity of liquid assets and low prices (wages), low-denomination
coins and bills were traded at premium over its face value. This situation propitiated
the arbitrage in low-denomination money holdings through the exchange of $100 and $50
bills for $5 and $1 bills, when Panamanians traded with foreign visitors. In that sense,
even though foreign visitors provided convertibility of portfolio at the natural rate, and
Panamanians expected it to be the exchange rate in the long run, there was an equilibrium
in which low-denomination money holdings were bestowed an extrinsic value in virtue of
its enhanced liquidity. This situation continued even when the banking system returned to
normal operations, all restrictions to withdrawals and deposits were removed, and banks
could provide convertibility of portfolios.
This paper builds a theoretical model capable to explain under which conditions a bubble
of this nature can arise even when money holders can freely reconvert their portfolios at
the natural rate. Here, it is important to highlight that even though the premium over
low-denomination money holdings has existed in many episodes under a shortage of liquid
assets, it has not been always the case. The understanding of this phenomenon results
crucial for monetary policy-makers, especially nowadays when Greek banks prepare for a
banking closure like the one happened in Panama twenty ﬁve years ago. However, despite
of its recurrence and importance, such kind of phenomenon cannot be explained with the
current models of indivisible money. Therefore, we consider that the importance of counting
with such a model is twofold. On one hand, it has value in that it permits to explain what
are the economic forces underlying such puzzling equilibria which are not so rare in history;
and on the other hand, permits to explore other associated monetary phenomena, such
as: speculative trading strategies, counterfeit coins, and capacity constraints. Moreover,
it provides a theoretical foundation for some results elaborated by authors of economic
history. For instance, it validates the ﬁndings in Reddish and Weber (2011a, 2011b) where
they showed that for the case of mid-XIIth century England, the inclusion of small coins
where sought by the sovereign to increase the population's welfare through an increase in
the frequency of trade.
The model constructed is a money search model of divisible product and indivisible
money holdings as in Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi (1995), that shares four fundamen-
tal characteristics. First, it is a model where ﬁat money serves the purpose of medium of
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exchange, but where agents are equipped with low and high denomination coins, and there-
fore where the denomination indiﬀerence of standard models is removed2. Second, there is
a natural rate at which high coins can be converted into low coins. Such convertibility is
provided exogenously by a Poisson technology which with agents overlaps in the economy.
Third, to value money holdings at the natural rate constitute a feasible equilibrium of the
model. Fourth, for a speciﬁc parameterization of the model, there exists an equilibrium
where the convertibility of money holdings departs from the natural rate, and low coins are
traded with a premium. Speciﬁcally, we show that if the arrival rate of such convertibil-
ity opportunities is positive but bounded above, an equilibrium when low-denominations
have an extrinsic value exists for any positive interest rate. Moreover, we ﬁnd there exists
an equilibrium in which agents will generically split a two-low-coins portfolio in a trade
when they have the opportunity to do so. On the other hand, when the arrival rate of the
exogenous technology is suﬃciently high, this equilibrium is no longer guaranteed since a
high-coin buyer would prefer to wait, convert their portfolio, and then consume the alleged
higher quantity that a two-low-coins portfolio would give him.
Finally, as mentioned before, this theoretical construction also allows us to explore some
issues related with the presence (or lack of) small denominations. In particular, we can relax
one important feature of indivisible/divisible monetary search models: that the quantity
traded only depends on the kind of the monetary array in exchange, since it is assumed
sellers always are able to produce the quantity requested by buyers. This assumption
ignores the fact that sellers regularly have shortage of inventories or capacity constraints
-recall the situation in the US of XIXth century, but which is worthy to investigate in
our environment since it could make low-denomination and convertible-high-denomination
portfolios welfare-improving. Precisely, as an extension of the baseline model we impose
capacity restrictions to assess the extent at which the portfolio composition can remediate
such friction. The main result shows that under a proper discounting rate, divisibility can
eliminate a sort of no-trade ineﬃciency.
2It is important to highlight that our interest resides in exploring the extrinsic value of low denomination
coins over their counterpart, and hence our model has to be one of indivisible money, since precisely
a premium in exchange emerges from the fact that the spectrum of prices in the bargaining process of
exchange is greater when small coins are present. According to Wallace (2003) ...it is hard to imagine that
a small change problem could exist if the stuﬀ out of which large coins were made were divisible in the
sense in which goods in standard models are divisible.
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Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
environment and stresses the main distinctive features of the model. Section 3 deﬁnes the
diﬀerent classes of equilibria proposed and show their existence. Section 4 presents the
extended model with capacity constraints and reformulate the diﬀerent equilibria. Section
5 discusses how the presence of ﬁxed costs and inﬂation can aﬀect the sustained equilibria.
Finally, section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 The environment
The economy consists of a continuum of inﬁnitely lived agents, whose population is nor-
malized to unity and grows at an exogenous rate γ > 0. There are K ≥ 3 types of goods
-which are divisible but not storable- and K types of agents, who are uniformly distributed
among types. So, for a given type k the measure of agents that share it is η = 1/K.
Agents produce and consume goods in discrete points of continuous time, using r > 0 as
their preference discount rate. In her production facet, an agent of type k produces a good
of type k, incurring in a disutility cost of c(q) = q. The unique input in the production
function is the costly participation of the agent, which precludes her to look for another
peer to make a transaction once exchange has been agreed. Similarly, in her consumption
facet an agent of type k has specialized preferences toward the good of type k + 1 (mod
K); which means that the demand of any agent can be satisﬁed only by a fraction η of
the population. Agents derive satisfaction from consumption according to the function
u(q) : R+ → R+, which is strictly increasing, strictly concave, satisﬁes u(0) = 0 and fulﬁlls
Inada conditions: limq→∞ u′(q) = 0 and limq→0 u′(q) =∞. Additionally, Q∗ and Q¯ denote,
respectively, the points where u(Q∗) = Q∗ and u′(Q¯) = 1.
In the search process, agents meet randomly and pair wise according to a Poisson
matching technology with arrival rate λ ∈ R+. For convenience, the rate λη at which a
buyer meets an agent of her consumption-type (i.e. of the type located at the right of her
own) is normalized to unit without loss of generality.
All these assumptions make the exchange process a necessary event for consumption to
take place. Nonetheless, barter, reputation and commodity monies are not viable mecha-
nisms to generate trade, and hence it is necessary to introduce an object that plays the role
of medium of exchange in order to achieve a distinct equilibrium from autarchy3. Precisely,
3Since agents meet randomly, it is not possible for them to be engaged in a long-lasting relationship in
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to serve this role it is assumed the existence of an intrinsically worthless and storable object
called ﬁat money, which is available in coins of high and low denominations.
Initially, the fractions of the population who are endowed with one high coin, one low
coin, and two low coins are mh, m1, and m2, respectively. Such sub-populations are disjoint
in pairs with the property that 0 <
∑
h,1,2mi < 1. Their union is called buyers, while the
remaining m0 ≡ 1−mh−m1−m2 are called sellers. Buyers attempt to exchange money for
goods and sellers attempt to produce for money. Consequently, an agent carrying money
cannot be a seller.
No agent can produce these coins at any cost, nor can they derive utility from direct
consumption of them. Permanently, a fraction M2 of the newborn agents are endowed
with two low coins, whereas a proportion Mh is endowed with one high coin. The rest
1 −Mh −M2 participate in the economy as sellers4. To keep the distribution on money
holdings tractable, it is assumed that there exist limitations in storage capacity, which
imposes a restriction to keep a maximum stock of one high coin or two low coins at any
time (i.e. low-coins are more portable).
Institutionally, there is not a centralized market where a walrasian auctioneer set prices
and enforces long term agreements; therefore prices are determined through bilateral bar-
gaining. Moreover, all actions in the economy are considered anonymous in the sense that
the record of transactions for each agent is private information. All these conditions imply
that every exchange shall be made on a quid pro quo basis, meaning that the amount of
product delivered by the seller should equalize the value of the money given in exchange by
the buyer at current prices (i.e. ﬁnancial markets are not available). Because goods cannot
be stored, their production, exchange and consumption must be simultaneous.
In addition, agents are assumed to have access to a Poisson technology5 with exogenous
which reputation can act as a signal of the commitment of one agent to deliver a promised good in the
future, given that she receives a good of her consumption-type in the present.
4Notice no newborn agents incorporate into the economy as low-coin buyers, and hence, its steady state
value is determined by the strategies of high and two-low coins buyers with respect to the conversion and
splitting of their money holdings. Therefore, a higher measure of low-coin buyers in steady-state would
reﬂect the extrinsic value of counting with convertible and divisible portfolios.
5Think for example in an automaton with inﬁnite storage capacity in each type of coin, which with
agents overlaps in the market. Its natural analogy in actual times is automatic telling machines which
provide convertibility up to some denomination, whose availability rate is governed by its distribution
on a determined region. However, unlike the present environment, people have to pay an annual fee for
using them and so, their decision of splitting money holdings shall take this variable in the correspondent
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arrival rate θ, that allows them to change -without any cost and at any time- a high coin
for two low coins and vice versa. This is the only way buyers can convert their portfolios
since they are not allowed to swap notes among themselves.
Finally, following Trejos andWright (1995), when a buyer meets a seller of her consumption-
type, the amount of output traded obeys a bilateral bargaining of take it or leave it"
repeated oﬀers, that resembles a standard bargaining game as in Rubinstein (1982). In
general, the outcome of the game would depend on some exogenous variables such as the
bargaining power, the impatience of the agents, and the intensity of the preferences over
the good traded; however, for the sake of isolating the analysis of the problem at hand,
we assume buyers retain the entire bargaining power and thus, that they extract the whole
surplus in any trade with a seller.
3 Equilibrium analysis
The environment proposed in the previous section produces a large set of equilibria, but
the analysis will be restricted only to the stationary class6. Let Qh, Q1 and Q2 be the
quantities of consumption traded in exchange for a high coin, one low coin, and two low
coins, respectively. It is possible to observe that such quantities depend solely on the type
of coins involved in the exchange and not on the valuation assigned by the seller to the
good traded, due to the fact that negotiations correspond to a take it or leave it oﬀer,
in which the buyer retains all the bargaining power. Likewise, we denote Vh, V1 and V2
buyers' value functions associated to the states of holding such combinations of coins, and
V0 the life-time value of being a seller.
To complete the description, deﬁne νh, ν1 and ν2 as the probabilities that a buyer
with such money holdings concretes a deal when an opportunity comes to her; ρ as the
probability that a buyer changes a high coin for two low coins when she has access to the
Poisson technology; and δ as the probability that a buyer who holds two low coins spends
only one of them when she has the opportunity to concrete an exchange with a seller (i.e.
the probability that she divides her two-low-coin portfolio).
beneﬁt-cost analysis.
6The path for the value of money is given exogenously at a constant level Qt = Q for each type of coin,
which allows to solve explicitly for the value functions of the stationary equilibria.
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According to this, Bellman's equation for a high-coin buyer yields
rVh = m0 max
νh∈[0,1]
{νh[u(Qh) + V0 − Vh]}+ θ max
ρ∈[0,1]
{ρ[V2 − Vh]} (1)
This equation describes the life-time value of being a high-coin buyer, rVh, as the sum of
two terms. The ﬁrst one corresponds to the rate at which a buyer meets an agent of her
consumption-type (that is normalized to the unit), times the probability that such agent
be a seller in the moment, m0, times the probability that the buyer concretes a deal, νh,
times the proﬁt of such transaction -which equalize the utility obtained from consuming
the correspondent quantity, plus the net proﬁt of switching the status from buyer to seller:
u(Qh)+V0−Vh. Likewise, the second term corresponds to the proﬁt realized when changing
a high coin for two low coins, V2 − Vh, times the probability that the agent optimally uses
the mentioned technology when the opportunity comes to her. Both terms appear in an
additively separable form, since they are governed by two independent Poisson stochastic
processes, and thus the probability that an agent faces both opportunities at the same time
has zero measure.
Analogously, the value function for two-low-coins buyer is given by the following Bellman
equation
rV2 = m0 max
ν2∈[0,1]
{
max
δ∈[0,1]
{(1− δ)[u(Q2) + V0 − V2] + δ[u(Q1) + V1 − V2]}
}
(2)
+θ max
ρ∈[0,1]
{(1− ρ)[Vh − V2]}
Unlike the former equation, the latter presents the diﬀerence that when a buyer meets a
seller of her consumption-type, she must decide whether or not to spend her whole portfolio.
If she does it, she consumes as much as her money holdings allow, and then switches status
from buyer to seller, deriving a net proﬁt of u(Q2)+V0−V2. If on the contrary she splits her
portfolio, then the correspondent quantity is consumed, and the remaining coin is kept by
the agent, deriving a utility of u(Q1)+V1−V2. Thus, in a trade with a seller, a two-low-coin
buyer earns a proﬁt that is computed as an average of the previous expressions weighted by
the corresponding factors: (1− δ) and δ. By symmetry with the previous case, a buyer of
this kind can also access the same exogenous technology to recompose her money holdings
which, when utilized, yields to her an expected proﬁt of θ[Vh − V2]7.
rV1 = m0 max
ν1∈[0,1]
{ν1[u(Q1) + V0 − V1]} (3)
7So far it has been used the word type to diﬀerentiate an agent by her production-type, and now -to
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Bellman's equation for one-low-coin buyer satisﬁes (3), which shall be interpreted in a
similar fashion of the other two. Finally, seller's Bellman equation satisﬁes
rV0 = mhνh[Vh − V0 − c(Qh)] +m2ν2[V2 − V0 − c(Q2)] +m1ν1[V1 − V0 − c(Q1)] (4)
Here, seller's life-time value corresponds to the sum of the expected proﬁts obtained by
trading with each kind of buyer. Such proﬁts are equal to the product of two factors: the
probability of trading with each kind of buyer, miνi, and the net proﬁt of changing status,
Vi − V0 − c(Qi). Nonetheless, using the fact that buyers retain the entire bargaining power
and seller's cost function is linear, the equilibrium quantities system can be simpliﬁed as
follows8:
rQh = m0 max
νh∈[0,1]
{νh[u(Qh)−Qh]}+ θ max
ρ∈[0,1]
{ρ[Q2 −Qh]} (5)
rQ2 = m0 max
ν2∈[0,1]
{
ν2{max
δ∈[0,1]
{(1− δ)[u(Q2)−Q2] + δ[u(Q1) +Q1 −Q2]}
}
(6)
+θ max
ρ∈[0,1]
{(1− ρ)[Qh −Q2]}
rQ1 = m0 max
ν1∈[0,1]
{ν1[u(Q1)−Q1]} (7)
It is not hard to observe that buyers of each kind will trade with certainty if the argument
of the following indicator functions is satisﬁed
νh = I{u(Qh) ≥ Qh} (8)
ν2 = I{δ[u(Q1) +Q1] + (1− δ)u(Q2) ≥ Q2} (9)
ν1 = I{u(Q1) ≥ Q1} (10)
From (8) and (10), a buyer who holds either a high or low coin will always trade if the utility
of consuming the quantity negotiated with the seller is at least equal to the discounted value
of preserving her monetary array. In the same sense, from (9) a two-low-coin buyer will
agree to trade if the linear combination of the discounted utilities obtained for exchanging
one and two coins respectively, is at least equal to the discounted utility of preserving her
monetary endowment intact.
avoid reader's confusion- it will be adopted the convention of using the word kind to diﬀerentiate a buyer
by her money holdings.
8It in turn implies that Qi = Vi for all i ∈ I ≡ {1, 2, h}, and consequently that Q0 = 0.
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Likewise, buyer's optimal strategy of using the Poisson technology to convert their
portfolios must satisfy,
ρ =

0 if Qh > Q2
∈ [0, 1] if Qh = Q2
1 if Qh < Q2
(11)
Such pattern indicates that high-coin buyers will always convert their unitary portfolio into
one composed by two low coins, if a low denomination has an extrinsic value in an exchange
with a seller.
On the other hand, the decision of splitting a monetary array composed by two low
coins depends on whether the present utility of consuming the quantity given in exchange
for one low coin u(Q1), plus the continuation value of holding a low coin Q1, exceeds the
present utility of consuming the equilibrium quantity for two low coins u(Q2). In summary,
δ =

0 if u(Q1) +Q1 < u(Q2)
∈ [0, 1] if u(Q1) +Q1 = u(Q2)
1 if u(Q1) +Q1 > u(Q2)
(12)
Law of motion. The law of motion for the correspondent sub-population of buyers are
presented below. Furthermore, they are equated to zero to solve for steady state values:
m˙h = m2θ(1− ρ)−mhθρ+ γ(Mh −mh) = 0 (13)
m˙2 = mhθρ−m2θ(1− ρ)− (1−mh −m2 −m1)m2ν2δ + γ(M2 −m2) = 0 (14)
m˙1 = 2(1−mh −m2 −m1)m2ν2δ − γm1 = 0 (15)
To understand how these expressions are derived, ﬁrst notice that an exchange realized,
either between a seller and a one-high-coin buyer or between a seller and a two-low-coin
buyer who decides to spend all her cash, does not impact equilibrium sub-populations
since the coin just changes hands leaving the distribution unaltered. However, high-coin
and two-low-coin buyers can eventually modify the distribution by accessing the exogenous
technology to recompose their money holdings, or in the case of the latter by splitting their
portfolio in a trade with a seller.
Particularly, ﬁrst term in (13) indicates the fraction of high-coin buyers increases when
two-low-coin buyers use the exogenous technology to aggregate their portfolios. On the
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contrary, second term implies it diminishes when there are high-coin buyers who use the
Poisson technology to divide their money holdings. In turn, the third term captures the
eﬀect that the constant ﬂow of new agents -who join as high-coin buyers- produces to the
system.
In the same line of reasoning, the ﬁrst two terms in (14) are the counterpart analogous of
(13) applied to the two-low-coin case. However, here a third term shall be added to account
for the reduction made up when two-low-coin buyers decide to divide their portfolio in a
particular meeting with a seller. By undertaking such action, the fraction of two-low-coin
buyers diminishes because the original buyer remains with a low coin for a future purchase,
while the seller switches to a buyer with a low coin. As before, the fourth term stands for
the adjustment made by the inﬂow of newborn agents endowed with such money holdings.
With respect to the fraction of one-low-coin buyers, it is precisely duplicated when two-low
coin buyers split their money holdings in a trade (by virtue of the previous analysis), and
decreases at population's relative rate of growth. Naturally, the proportion of sellers is
computed as the complement of buyers' union.
Once the whole environment is speciﬁed, the deﬁnition of the equilibrium constitutes
the next step, which, precisely, is introduced below.
Deﬁnition 1 A stationary equilibrium is a collection of a vector of quantities (Qh, Q2, Q1),
a vector of buyers' strategies (νh, ν2, ν1, ρ, δ), and a vector of sub-populations (mh,m2,m1),
that satisfy equations (5) - (15).
There is always a degenerate nonmonetary equilibrium which satisﬁes all the conditions
stated before. Clearly, in such an equilibrium agents do not grant any value to money (i.e.
Qh = Q1 = Q2 = 0) and hence autarky is maintained. Nevertheless, this equilibrium is
trivial and its existence does not serve the aim of deriving any type of conditions that could
justify the extrinsic value of low-denomination money holdings; therefore, other classes of
equilibria that emerge under the proposed environment must be explored.
Deﬁnition 2 Let Q ≡ {Qh, Q2, Q1} be the set of equilibrium quantities, and let P(Q)
the power set of Q. Each subset Q ⊂ P(Q) is considered an equilibrium conﬁguration,
such that Qi > 0 for all Qi ∈ Q, and Qj = 0 for all Qj ∈ Q/Q. Hence, it is possible
to deﬁne three classes of equilibria (i.e. three selections of P(Q)), equilibria of class one:
Q1 ≡ {{Q1, Q2, Q3}}, equilibria of class two: Q2 ≡ {{Qh, Q2}, {Q2, Q1}, {Qh, Q1}}, and
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equilibria of class three: Q3 ≡ {{Qh}, {Q2}, {Q1}}. Moreover, a degenerate equilibrium
corresponds to ∅.
Nonetheless, there are some restrictions over the set of equilibria that can emerge. For
instance, there can be no equilibrium in which Q1 > 0 and Q2 = 0, because agents always
have the option of disposing or storing the additional coin with no cost. Moreover, if agents
encounter the automaton with positive probability, then equilibrium quantities exchanged
for two low coins and one high coin should be either zero or both positive. The feasible
equilibria under this environment are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 For all r > 0, there exist equilibria Q1 and Q12 ≡ {Qh, Q2}. Furthermore,
if θ = 0 (i.e. if convertibility of money holdings is absent) there will be three additional
equilibria: Q22 ≡ {Q2, Q1}, Q13 ≡ {Qh}, and Q23 ≡ {Q2}.
From the previous proposition we conclude that if there exists an exogenous technology
that allows the re-composition of money holdings, it is possible to sustain equilibria where
both denominations have value.9 In other words, the absence of a mechanism that provides
convertibility of the currency is a necessary condition to support equilibria in which only
one conﬁguration of the money holdings has positive value.
Observe that in equilibria Q12 and Q23 divisibility is worthless, and therefore the buyer
will never split her money holdings in a particular trade. Such situation is plausible, for
instance under high inﬂation, where the proportion of newborn buyers who injects money
in the economy is very high, and so, agents would like to spend the highest amount of
ﬁat money when they have the opportunity to do so -a hot potato eﬀect. Similarly, when
sellers have to incur in a ﬁxed cost to produce a positive quantity, and hence, there exists
a minimum threshold under which it is not proﬁtable to produce for a particular buyer,
a Q12 equilibrium could emerge. In addition, it is interesting to examine whether in such
equilibrium Q2 has an extrinsic value over Qh. As it is demonstrated in the following
proposition, in equilibrium both portfolios should be traded at par.
Proposition 4 In any equilibrium Q12, it must be the case that Q2 = Qh.
9An identical result would be obtained if the exogenous technology is replaced by a monetary authority
that controls the amount of ﬁat money in the economy and provides the convertibility of money holdings.
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A situation of this nature, where low coins are traded only when they come in full
capacity portfolios, resembles an economy with two kind of coins (e.g. white and black)
where the denomination role is irrelevant. According to this result, if both money holdings
are traded in equilibrium, they must do it at the same value, otherwise the strong coin
would displace the weak one, as it has happened in many episodes of the history.
At ﬁrst glance, this result may be surprising because, if for instance, agents believe that
one unit of high-denomination money values less than two units of low denomination, then
the latter should command more value in exchange, despite of whether one unit of low
denomination money has value or not. A potential explanation for this puzzle would come
from models where money has some small albeit positive intrinsic value, as in Wallace and
Zhu (2004). Their argument dictates that if goods are divisible and marginal utility at zero
consumption is bounded but suﬃciently large, then a buyer can always extract some small
but positive output from a seller due to the fact that money has some small but positive
intrinsic value. Anticipating such situation, a seller agrees to produce for more than the
face value of the coin used in the exchane , since she reasons the same will apply in a future
meeting with a buyer. The authors show that under this environment a unique production
level arise in equilibrium. Now, suppose in the present setting an equilibrium where Q1 = 0
and Q2 > Qh > 0 exists. If here the value of convertibility θ(Q2−Qh) were identiﬁed with
the intrinsic value of low-denomination money holdings in the model of Wallace and Zhu
(2004), then a unique production level would be expected10. However, this argument suﬀers
from two weaknesses. The ﬁrst is that convertibility does not correspond vis-a-vis to the
intrinsic value property of a monetary unit, since per se it does not render any utility from
direct consumption. Moreover, the service of convertibility varies with respect to θ, and so,
the application of the Wallace-Zhu result only holds if θ is suﬃciently low, but proposition
4 is stated for all θ > 0.
From the mosaic of equilibria analyzed up to this point, we have found justiﬁcation for
the endogenous value of ﬁat money, however, we still have to show that low-denomination
money holdings have an extrinsic value in exchange. It is, that some sellers will be willing
to deliver a major quantity of output when they deal with a buyer holding two low coins,
than the quantity they would render when dealing with a buyer holding a high coin (i.e.
Q2 > Qh). In general, it could be possible to have Qh < Q1, but in this case a class-one
10The same analysis will hold in an equilibrium where Q1 = 0 and Qh > Q2 > 0.
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equilibrium in which Q2 > Q1 > Qh > 0 would arise. In such situation, the low coin
strictly dominates the high one, and the option of splitting a two-low-coin portfolio does
not play any role in the determination of the quantities traded. So, the analysis will be
focused on ﬁnding conditions that support a conﬁguration where Q2 > Qh > Q1 > 0 (i.e.
the only class-one equilibrium in which low-coin portfolios have an extrinsic value). In fact,
its existence is stated in the proposition below.
Proposition 5 If θ < θ¯ then for all r > 0 there exists an equilibrium where Q2 > Qh > Q1
and buyers generically split their portfolios. Moreover, for r = r¯(0,1) buyers are indiﬀerent
with respect to the decision of splitting their portfolio.
In this context two-low-coin portfolios are traded with a premium over their high-single-
unit counterparts if the arrival rate of the exogenous technology is not too high, because
otherwise a high-coin buyer would prefer to wait to convert the portfolio to a two-low-coins
portfolio and consume a higher quantity, even when they are suﬃciently patient.
4 Capacity constraints in the production
One important feature of the environment presented in the last section is that a seller
is always able to produce the equilibrium quantity requested by any kind of buyer in a
particular trade. However, it might be the case that sellers experience capacity constraints
that make it impossible to produce a quantity greater than a certain level. Under such a
scenario, a buyer who meets a seller of this class11, shall decide whether to instantaneously
consume a quantity lesser than the maximum feasible, or waiting for the event to meet
either an unconstrained or a less constrained seller of her consumption-type.
A priori, an environment of this nature could magnify the potential beneﬁts of having
a portfolio with low denominations, because if agents can split their money holdings, then
11To further clarify the notation utilized, the word class is reserved exclusively to diﬀerentiate an agent
by her seller's nature: constrained or unconstrained. Thus, a buyer can be totally determined by her type of
good, by the kind of her money holdings, and by her class when acting as seller. In particular, it is assumed
that at t = 0 nature (or God) selects the class of the agent, which never changes but only manifests when
the agent is a seller. In other words, the class of an agent is private information that is revealed until a
meet is realized, but before the negotiation is carried over. A natural generalization would make seller's
type private, even during the bargaining process, as in Trejos (1999).
15
they could partially remediate the curse of facing a constrained seller by smoothing their
consumption path.
Notice that even if lotteries over the quantities and denominations traded are allowed
in the present environment, as in Berentsen et al (2002), it does not solve the diﬃculties
entailed by the capacity constraints. In their paper, they show that when buyer's bargaining
power tends to one, the unit of indivisible money is exchanged with a probability less
than one, and the socially eﬃcient quantity is always produced. However, in the present
environment albeit buyers retain the whole bargaining power, there might be cases in which
they do not get the socially eﬃcient quantity if they meet a suﬃciently constrained seller.
Therefore, low denominations have a role to play in an economy with capacity constraints,
like one formed by small and unconnected producers12.
Modifying the baseline model to serve this purpose, we assume now the existence of
two classes of sellers: constrained and unconstrained, as cited before. Moreover, to assure
symmetry on the types of goods among the classes of sellers, it is assumed the latter are
uniformly distributed among the former. In other words, we assume that the probability
of being a constrained seller (denoted by α) is the same for any type of agent.
Recall that Qh, Q2 and Q1 are the equilibrium quantities given in exchange for the
respective money holdings, which for our purposes are designed as the maximum quantities
attainable in an exchange with a seller. Let the random variable Q˜, with distribution F (·),
be the maximum quantity that a constrained seller is able to produce; and let [Qmax1 , Q
max
2 ]
be the support of Q˜, where Qmax1 and Q
max
2 are the maximum quantities produced in
exchange for those money holdings, among all equilibria deﬁned in proposition 1.
4.1 When only one denomination is available
In both equilibria of class three, the environment resembles an economy in which there is
just one denomination of ﬁat money, and therefore, there is just one kind of buyers. Since
we assume they can throw ﬁat money without any cost at any time, in such equilibria the
buyers holding the worthless monetary array become sellers instantaneously.
Thus, when only a denomination is available, the value function for buyers of class j
12For instance, the economy of United States in the mid-XIXth century.
16
holding an i monetary array13 (within the conﬁguration where i has value) is given by
rQji = m0
(
α
∫ Qmax2
Qmax1
max{u(min{Q˜,Qi})−Qji +Qj0, 0} · I{Qci−Qc0≥Q˜} dF (Q˜)
+(1− α)[u(Qi)−Qji +Qj0] · I{Qui −Qu0≥Q˜}
)
(16)
Unlike Bellman's equation in the case without capacity constraints, buyer's life-time value
now depends on whether she meets a constrained or an unconstrained seller. Speciﬁcally, it
is composed as the probability of meeting a seller of her consumption-type, m0, times the
expected gain of a match -which now is linear in the probability of ﬁnding a constrained
seller α. However, notice that such gain depends on the willingness of the seller to produce
for money (which is summarized in the argument of the indicator function above). Hence,
when a buyer meets an unconstrained seller, the gain of the trade is [u(Qi) − Qji + Qj0]:
the utility of consuming the maximum quantity attainable in that economy (or equilibrium
conﬁguration), Qi, minus the life-time value of delivering the corresponding money array
Qji , plus the ﬂow return of being a seller, Q
j
0. On the other hand, when a buyer meets
a constrained seller, the gain depends on the realization of the random variable Q˜, and is
equal to
∫ Qmax2
Qmax1
max{u(min{Q˜,Qi})−Qji +Qj0, 0}. In a single coincidence-meeting either the
buyer spends her money holding, which yields u(min{Q˜,Qi})−Qji +Qj0, or remains a buyer,
which yields no surplus. The argument in the utility function reﬂects the fact that although
the maximum quantity feasible to produce in the economy is Qmax2 , no seller would deliver a
quantity greater than Qi for an i monetary array. So, the quantity exchanged when a buyer
trades with a constrained seller of her consumption-type is min{Q˜,Qi}. From this fact
follows that the probability of reaching the maximum quantity attainable in the economy
when meeting a constrained seller is 1− F (Qi).
Because utility function u(·) is strictly increasing, buyers' value function satisﬁes a
reservation property. That is, there exists a minimum threshold under which it is not
proﬁtable for a buyer to accept a deal. Let X ji = [Q¯ji , Qi] denote the set of acceptable
quantities for a buyer of kind i and class j. Here, Q¯ji (the reservation value) satisﬁes
Q¯ji = u
−1(Qji −Qj0) (17)
13Here the subscript diﬀerentiates the agent by her monetary array (i.e. i ∈ {2, h}) and the superscript
does it by her class of seller (i.e., j ∈ {c, u} where c denotes constrained and u unconstrained).
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Clearly, if Q˜ > Q¯ji , buyer (i, j) is willing to trade with the seller. Hence, seller's value
function becomes
rQc0 = miα
∫
X ci
max {−Q˜+Qji −Qj0, 0} dF (Q˜) (18)
Her ﬂow return is now equal to the probability of having a meeting-coincidence with a
constrained buyer, αmi, times the expected gain in that trade. It turns out the value
function of an unconstrained seller is always zero, since in that case F (·) places all the
probability in the maximum quantity attainable in the economy. On the other hand, the
value function for a constrained seller, Qc0 is not always zero, because she could trade for less
than the maximum attainable, and then materialize a proﬁt later in her buyer's facet. An
implication of this result is that the reservation quantity for constrained agents is less than
for unconstrained ones, and consequently, X ci ⊂ X ui ≡ Qi, and therefore that unconstrained
buyers only trade with unconstrained sellers.
In virtue of proposition 4, the analysis of equilibrium Q21 under capacity constraints is
totally determined by the set of equations established above. Therefore, up to this point
there exist all the required elements to deﬁne a reﬁnement of equilibria, when there are
constrained sellers in the economy and only one denomination is available.
Deﬁnition 6 A reﬁnement of equilibria Q22 and Q1, under the capacity constraints as-
sumption, is a collection of a vector of quantities {Qc0, Qj1, Qj2, Qjh}j∈{c,u}, and a vector of
reservation values {Q¯j1, Q¯j2, Q¯jh}j∈{c,u} that satisﬁes equations (16) - (18), in the conﬁgura-
tions where i ∈ I has a positive value.
4.2 When low denominations have an extrinsic value
In the conﬁgurations where portfolios are divisible (i.e. Q22 and Q1) agents have an addi-
tional instrument to deal with the frictions introduced by sellers' capacity constraints. In
fact, given that all sellers have the capacity to produce Q1, all two-low-coin buyers can
expect a return of at least u(Q1) +Q1 in any single coincidence-meeting.
In general, value functions for sellers and buyers are similar in structure to those in
the last subsection, but have slight diﬀerences that arise from the presence of low denom-
inations in money holdings. Since for practical purposes equilibrium Q22 is embedded in
equilibrium Q1, the former is considered as the general framework14. Bellman's equations
14Under the awareness that value function for high-coin buyers is zero in Q22.
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then corresponds to,
rQjh = m0
(
α
∫ Qmax2
Qmax1
max{u(min{Q˜,Qh})−Qjh +Qj0, 0} · I{Qch−Qc0≥Q˜} dF (Q˜)
+(1− α)[u(Qh)−Qjh +Qj0] · I{Quh−Qu0≥Q˜}
)
+ θ(Qj2 −Qjh) (19)
Observe that the quantity a high-coin buyer can extract from a seller in a trade has Q1 as
its minimum lower bound. So, if in equilibrium Q1, Qh →(−) Q1, the burden of capacity
constraints is negligible for those buyers, but is maximized when Qh →(+) Q2. Nonetheless,
and despite this fact, high-coin buyers count with an indirect mechanism to avoid the curse
of facing a constrained seller by means of the exogenous technology. Hence, if the frequency
to meet the Poisson automaton is high enough and agents are patient, it would be proﬁtable
to delay a trade, given the distribution of the random variable that governs the constraint.
Life-time value for one-low-coin buyers is the same as in (7),
rQj1 = m0(u(Q1)−Q1) = rQ1 (20)
Two-low-coin buyers have additionally the option of splitting their money holding when
facing a constrained seller. Recall that for any single coincidence-meeting, the lower bound
of the ﬂow return -if they trade- is given by u(Q1) +Q1. Likewise, if they attempt to trade
the whole portfolio, they will face seller's constraint, and hence, a reservation value can be
deﬁned as before. Bellman's equation then yields,
rQj2 = m0
{
(1− δ)
[
α
(∫ Qmax2
Qmax1
max {u(Q˜)−Qj2 +Qj0, 0} · I{Qj2−Qj0≥Q˜} dF (Q˜)
)
(21)
+(1− α)(u(Q2)−Qj2 +Qj0)
]
+ δ[u(Q1) +Q1 −Qj2]
}
To complete the framework, the bellman equation for sellers is deﬁned as in the former
case, with the only particularity that they can now trade with buyers holding any array of
coins. Nonetheless, the summation is just taken over {2, h} because for any kind of seller
the surplus of producing for a low coin is always zero.
rQc0 =
∑
h,2
miα
∫
Xc
max {−Q˜+Qji −Qj0, 0} dF (Q˜)0 (22)
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Since the Bellman equation for high coin buyers is independent of the analysis conducted
above, the deﬁnition of the equilibrium Q22 does not require any additional assumption.
So, the following deﬁnition formalizes the reﬁnement for the remaining equilibria in that
model.
Deﬁnition 7 A reﬁnement of equilibria Q22 and Q1, under the capacity constraints as-
sumption, is a collection of a vector of quantities {Qc0, Qj1, Qj2, Qjh}j∈{c,u}, and a vector of
reservation values {Q¯j1, Q¯j2, Q¯jh}j∈{c,u} that satisﬁes equations (19) - (22) , in the conﬁgu-
rations where i ∈ I has a positive value.
When there exist capacity constraints in the economy, the criterion deﬁned early to explain
how agents divide their money holdings shall be modiﬁed slightly to add -in the right hand
side of the inequalities in (12), seller's continuation value, which in the case of constrained
agents is not always zero. In such formulation, various scenarios should be addressed to
analyze the strategies of splitting in relation with the capacity constraints.
Case 1: u(Q1) + Q1 > u(Q2) + Q
c
0. Notice that, for both classes of agents the ﬂow
return of trading the two-low-coin portfolio is lesser than the life-time value of splitting
their money holdings, even if the seller is able to produce the maximum quantity feasible in
the economy. So, two-low-coin buyers will always split their portfolio, and therefore, both
classes of sellers will always produce for money when meeting them.
Case 2: u(Q1) + Q1 = u(Q2) + Q
c
0. Here, constrained buyers are indiﬀerent be-
tween splitting their monetary array and consuming Q2, provided that seller produce such
quantity. Observe that the unconstrained sellers are the unique class able to produce the
maximum attainable, and they will agree to do so, because after trading and becoming
buyers they can get -with certainty- u(Q1) +Q1 in any single coincidence-meeting. More-
over, when a constrained buyer meets a constrained seller, she will always split her money
holding because Q2 is not attainable. On the other hand, unconstrained buyers will always
split their two-low-coin portfolio, rather than being indiﬀerent, because for them Qu0 = 0,
and so Q2 is not high enough.
Case 3: u(Q1) + Q1 < u(Q2). In this case the analysis of divisibility is not straight-
forward. Let's ﬁrst analyze constrained buyers. Since the utility function u(·) is strictly
increasing, there exists a Qˆc2 such that u(Q1)+Q1−Qc0 = u(Qˆj2). Comparing this threshold
with the reservation quantity introduced in equation (17), it is possible to obtain a pattern
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for splitting portfolios of money in a particular trade. First of all, look that Qˆc2 ≥ Q¯c2 be-
cause splitting acts as an insurance or a lower bound for consumption. Inequality is strict
if a two-low-coin buyer expects to get a higher output than such insurance-consumption.
However, if the buyer is impatient enough, then there exists an interest rate r˜ at which
Qˆc2 = Q¯
c
2, or equivalently where u(Q1) + Q1 = Q
c
2. In such a case, a buyer and seller will
trade with certainty.
Summarizing, if buyers' time preference is suﬃciently high, then two-low-coin buyers
will split their money holdings more frequently to avoid the constraint friction. In that
scenario, both classes of agents would produce for money and a sort of no-trade friction is
ameliorated. As a corollary, the quantity produced under divisible equilibria is higher and
so is the welfare attained. The result is analogous to the one in Berentsen and Rocheteau
(2002) under divisible money. Speciﬁcally, they show that divisibility -allowing agents to
spend a small amount on low-valued varieties- eliminates the so-called no- trade and
too-much-trade ineﬃciencies, because buyers always have the option to split their money
holding and procrastinate consumption. However, in the case of indivisible money the result
is even stronger because total quantities and not varieties are involved.
5 Discussion: Fixed costs and inﬂation
So far, it has been analyzed just one speciﬁc characteristic in sellers' production func-
tion: their constraint to produce beyond a certain threshold deﬁned by a random variable.
However, technologies can display many other irregularities such as non-convexities and
discontinuities that are reﬂected in their correspondent cost functions. One example of the
former is the presence of ﬁxed costs, which force ﬁrms to pay a ﬁxed amount of money to
produce any positive quantity.
In the realm of the model developed here, ﬁxed costs could reduce the potential gains
in welfare produced by the presence of divisible money, and in the limit might justify the
presence of an equilibrium like Q12. Speciﬁcally, if the environment is modiﬁed to allow
sellers retain part of the bargaining power, and it is introduced a random variable that
governs the amount that each seller shall pay to produce, then, under some conditions
of time preference, there could be equilibria in which low coins would have no value, or
in which its value is substantially lesser than the exhibited in an economy without such
friction.
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As it is known, an economy with ﬁxed costs privileges the scale of production, because
the higher the quantity, the lesser the average cost. Hence, the surplus of sellers should be
suﬃciently high to make it proﬁtable the production of small quantities. However, even
if seller's bargaining power is high, those might have an incentive to reject the trade and
waiting either for a one-high-coin or a two-low-coin buyers.
In a framework of that nature, two-low-coin buyers now shall assess the probability of
facing a high-ﬁxed cost seller (who is the analogous counterpart of a low capacity seller), to
determine whether splitting the money holding is worthy. Depending on how patient buyers
are, and what is the distribution of the ﬁxed costs, it might be the case that divisibility
does not bestow a premium, in virtue proposition 4, that the only equilibrium that would
emerge is one in which a high-coin and two-low-coins money holdings are traded at par.
Nevertheless, if an inﬂation mechanism is introduced á la Li (1995), in which (for any
kind of buyers) a proportion of money holdings is conﬁscated and reallocated to sellers, then
buyers would have an incentive to spend more quickly because the value of their money
holdings is decreasing in time. Under a ﬁxed cost environment -and given a low time
preference- such situation would set a tradeoﬀ in the decision of splitting a two-low-coin
portfolio, since even the hot potato eﬀect of inﬂation calls for a quick spending (which
could be attained partially through splitting), the presence of ﬁxed cost acts in the other
direction.
With respect to an economy with capacity constraints, the tradeoﬀ is produced because
even inﬂation urges for a quick spend, there are potential losses in which buyers could incur
due to the capacity constraints of some sellers. Therefore, depending on the preference rate,
inﬂation could reinforce o deter trading strategies under ﬁxed costs and capacity constraints.
6 Concluding remarks
The model presented here is a search model of indivisible money -available in two denomi-
nations: low and high- and divisible product. Buyers cannot swap notes among themselves,
but are capable to exchange two low coins for one high coin -and viceversa, by means of
an exogenous Poisson technology. This exchange rate is exogenously determined and ﬁxed,
and therefore it is consider the natural rate to prevail in any trade. Under this environment
we show analytically the existence of three classes of equilibria in which diﬀerent denomi-
nation conﬁgurations exhibit positive value. Moreover, we prove that if only two-low-coin
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and high-coin portfolios have positive value in equilibrium, they should be traded at par,
without any deviation from its natural rate. This can be seen as an extension of the result
stated in the reﬁnement of Wallace and Zhou (2004), where they showed that if money
has a small intrinsic value, only one quantity of equilibrium could exist. Furthemore -and
most important- the model is able to prove the existence of an equilibrium where low-
denomination coins are traded with a premium if the arrival rate of the Poisson technology
is positive but bounded above. In that sense, even though the exogenous technology con-
verts portfolios at the natural rate, sellers are willing to exchange a higher quantity when
trade with low-coin buyers in virtue of the enhance liquidity their assets oﬀer. Therefore,
buyers will generically split a two-low coins portfolio when they have the opportunity to
do so. Using these results we showed in the second part of the paper that if there exist
capacity constraints in the supply side, the existence of a convertibility technology plus
the presence of low denomination money holdings could remediate (partially or totally)
the no-trade ineﬃciencies produced by such restriction. A result that cannot be trivially
obtained by introducing lotteries in the exchange process. Speciﬁcally, for proper discount
rates, two-low-coin buyers will always split their money holdings, and hence constrained
and unconstrained sellers will produce for money when meeting them. As a consequence,
the quantity produced is greater and so is the welfare attained. In the ﬁnal comments, we
discussed the approach to incorporate ﬁxed costs and inﬂation in the economy, which in the
absence of a profound analysis would have an ambiguous eﬀect on the decision of dividing
money holdings.
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Appendix: Proofs
A useful result for proving the propositions presented in the main text, is stated in the
following lemma.
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Lemma 8 If u(·) is a utility function that satisﬁes all the properties stated in the text,
then, a+ bu(·), is concave and has a unique positive ﬁxed point for all a, b ∈ R.
Proof. Concavity follows immediately. For uniqueness of the ﬁxed point, let h(·) : R→ R
deﬁned by h(q) = a + bu(q) − q. From the properties of u(q), it is possible to observe
that limq→∞ h′(q) = limq→∞(bu′(q) − 1) = −1, and so there exists q0 ∈ R+, such that
h′(q) < −12 for all q > q0. From the latter it follows that h(q) ≤ h(q0) − 12(q − q0) for all
q > q0; which in turn implies that limq→∞ h(q) = −∞. That is, h(q) = 0 for some q > q0.
Then it is clear that there exists some q¯ > 0, such that a+ bu(q¯) = q¯.
Proof of Proposition 3. Solving the system of equations (5) - (7), equilibrium quantities
can be expressed as a function of buyers' strategies δ, ρ, seller's steady-state sub-population
m0, the arrival rate of the exogenous technology, θ, and the interest rate r,
Qh =
m0(m0 + r + θ(1− ρ))
(m0 + r)(m0 + r + θ)
u(Qh) +
m0θρ(1− δ)
(m0 + r)(m0 + r + θ)
u(Q2)
+
m0δθρ(2m0 + r)
(m0 + r)
2(m0 + r + θ)
u(Q1) (23)
Q2 =
m0θ(1− ρ)
(m0 + r)(m0 + r + θ)
u(Qh) +
m0(1− δ)(1 + θρ)
(m0 + r)(m0 + r + θ)
u(Q2)
+
m0δ(2m0 + r)(m0 + r + θρ)
(m0 + r)
2(m0 + r + θ)
u(Q1) (24)
Q1 =
m0
(m0 + r)
u(Q1) (25)
In order to prove equilibria {Q22,Q13,Q23}, substitute θ = 0, in (23)-(24), to obtain the
following simpliﬁed expressions:
Qh =
m0
m0 + r
u(Qh) (26)
Q2 =
m0(1− δ)
(m0 + r)2
u(Q2) +
δ(2m0 + r)
m0 + r
Q1 (27)
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Clearly, Q1 = 0 and Qh = 0 are respective solutions of (25) and (26). Hence, by plugging
Q1 = 0 into (27) and by invoking the result stated in lemma 1, there exists Q2 > 0 solution
of (27). Thus, the existence of equilibrium Q23 is proved. By the same argument, existence
of equilibrium Q13 can also be assured.
Likewise, to prove the existence of equilibrium Q22, take the positive solution of (25), and
substitute it in (27), which by the result stated in lemma 1 has a unique positive solution.
Finally, the proof of equilibria Q12 and Q1 is embedded in the proof of propositions ?? and
??.
Proof of Proposition 4.
To prove the claim substitute δ = 0 in (23)-(25) since in equilibrium Q12 low coins only
have value when they are traded in portfolios of full storage capacity. Considering this, and
the fact that Q1 = 0 is a solution of (25), the expressions obtained in (23) and (24) can be
rearranged as below:
Qh − m0(m0 + r + θ)u(Qh) +m0θρ[u(Q2)− u(Qh)]
(m0 + r)(m0 + r + θ)
= 0 (28)
Q2 − m0{(m0 + r)u(Q2) + θu(Qh) + θρ[u(Q2)− u(Qh)]}
(m0 + r)(m0 + r + θ)
= 0 (29)
Now, suppose by contradiction that Qh < Q2. In such case, ρ must be equal to one.
Then, (28)-(29) can be re-arranged as
Qh −Ψ(Qh) = 0 (30)
Q2 − Γ(Q2) = 0 (31)
where Ψ(Qh) =
m0
m0+r+θ
u(Qh) +
θ
m0+r+θ
Γ(Q2), and Γ(Q2) =
m0
m0+r
u(Q2) as before. Clearly,
Qfh and Q
f
2 , the unique positive ﬁxed points of Ψ(·) and Γ(·) are the solutions of (30)-
(31). Nonetheless, observe that evaluating Ψ(·) at the ﬁxed point of Γ(·), it follows that
Ψ(Qf2) = Q
f
2 Thus, Q
f
2 is also a ﬁxed point of Ψ(·), but due to the uniqueness of the ﬁxed
point, it must be satisﬁed that Qf2 = Q
f
h. It contradicts the assumption that Q2 > Qh.
For the other direction, suppose that Q2 < Qh, which requires that ρ must be equal to
zero. In analogy with the previous case, (28)-(29) can be re-arranged as
Qh − Γ(Qh) = 0 (32)
26
Q2 −Ψ(Q2) = 0 (33)
where Qh and Q2 interchange roles as the arguments of Γ(·) and Ψ(·). After substituting
the ﬁxed point of Γ(·) in Ψ(·) we get a solution in which Qf2 = Qfh, contradicting the
assumption that Q2 < Qh. Therefore, in all equilibria of class Q12, equilibrium quantities
must satisfy Qh = Q2.
Proof of Proposition 5. We will guess and verify the existence of an equilibrium where
Q2 > Qh > Q1 > 0. First, we assume that trade is desirable and so, u(Qi) > Qi for all i,
which in turn implies that Qi < Q
∗ for all i. Second, following the optimal strategy in (17)
ρ = 1 which permits to simplify the system (5)-(7) to set conditions on r and θ, in order
to validate the inequalities Q2 > Qh and Qh > Q1.
Case 1: δ = 1. Inequality Qh > Q1 implies that
m0[u(Q1) +Q1 −Q2] > m0[u(Qh)−Qh] + θ[Q2 −Qh]
Since δ = 1 and hence u(Q1) +Q1 > u(Q2), it is suﬃcient to show that
m0[u(Q2)−Q2] > m0[u(Qh)−Qh] + θ[Q2 −Qh]
Equivalently,
u(Q2)− u(Qh)
Q2 −Qh > 1 +
θ
m0
Taking the limit Q2 → Qh the latter expression becomes
u′(Qh) > 1 +
θ
m0
(34)
Since u(Q) satisﬁes the Inada condition, the existence of Qh is guaranteed. Moreover,
it has to satisfy Qh < Q¯.
Now, since Q2 > Qh and θ > 0, inequality Qh > Q1 is satisﬁed for all r > 0.
Then, using the simpliﬁed version of (7) and (6) to obtain u(Q1) + Q1 and Q2 respec-
tively, the condition to validate δ = 1 implies that
m0
m0 + r
u(Q1) +Q1 < u(Q1) +Q1
which is satisﬁed for all r > 0.
27
Case δ ∈ (0, 1). As before, the equilibrium sought has to satisfy (34) but since δ ∈ (0, 1)
the interest rate has to satisfy the following equality
r = m0
Q2 − 2Q1
Q1 −Q2
To have a positive interest rate Q2 < 2Q1.
Case δ = 0. If the δ = 0 from the reduced Bellman equations it is possible to see that
the only admissible solution for Q1 = 0 since u(Q) has a unique ﬁxed point greater than
zero. Therefore, it is not possible to have an equilibrium where Q2 > Qh > Q1 > 0.
Finally, recalling that Q2 → Qh from the right, it is immediate to inspect that for all
δ ∈ (0, 1], u(Qi) > Qi for all i. In summary, if θ < θ¯ then, (i) for all r > 0 there exists an
equilibrium Q2 > Qh > Q1 where buyers always split their portfolios and (ii) for r = r¯(0,1)
there exists an equilibrium Q2 > Qh > Q1 where buyers are indiﬀerent with respect to the
decision of splitting their portfolio.
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